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John R. Sutton 
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Frank Dobbin 
Princeton University 
John W. Meyer and W. Richard Scott 
Stanford University 
This study uses longitudinal data on nearly 300 American employ- 
ers over the period 1955-85  to analyze the adoption of  disciplinary 
hearings and grievance procedures for nonunion salaried and hourly 
employees. Hypotheses are developed from an institutional perspec- 
tive  that focuses,  first,  on  uncertainty  arising  from  government 
mandates concerning equal employment opportunity and affirma- 
tive action and, second, on the role of  the human relations profes- 
sions  in  constructing  employment-relations  law  and  prescribing 
models of  compliance.  Event-history techniques  are used  to test 
these hypotheses against competing arguments concerning the inter- 
nal structure and labor market position of employing organizations. 
Results on all outcomes strongly support the institutionalist model. 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few decades, workplace due-process mechanisms such as 
grievance procedures have spread beyond their traditional domain among 
unionized, blue-collar industrial workers and have increasingly been ap- 
plied by employers to nonunion and salaried employees (Selznick 1969, 
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p. 91; McCabe 1988, chap. 2; Ewing 1989). There are a number of  pro- 
vocative speculations about why this has occurred. The business litera- 
ture treats legalization as a rational adjustment to an increasingly white- 
collar, highly trained labor pool. The workers in this pool have valuable 
and portable skills; given the opportunities for horizontal mobility, they 
expect a sense of  participation and citizenship in their work roles,  and 
they are disinclined to tolerate traditional autocratic management regimes 
(see, e.g., Ewing 1982). Similar arguments have been framed within a 
transaction-cost framework by Williamson (1985, 1986). Critical theorists 
such as Edwards (1979) suggest that legalization is part of a more general 
strategy of  formalized governance designed to enhance managerial con- 
trol over workers and to forestall unionization. 
These arguments treat legalization as a special case of  bureaucratiza- 
tion, and in so doing, they may underestimate the significance of  work- 
place legalization and misunderstand its origins. Philip Selznick argued 
over 20 years ago that legalization involves an important transformation 
in both the role of  the employee and the nature of  the organization.  To 
the degree that they have formal rights to question managerial decisions, 
employees  are  not just  subordinates  in  a  hierarchical  authority rela- 
tionship  but may become  members  of  an association  (Selznick  1969, 
pp.  51-52,  67-68);  legalization  lays the groundwork for employment- 
qua-membership to  become  a  "protectable  status."  Selznick  suggested 
that the extension of membership not only expands organizational bound- 
aries in  a  quantitative sense, but also  transforms  it qualitatively into 
an "emergent  polity"  (pp.  26-32).  In short,  legalization  signifies  the 
transformation of  the instrumental organization into an institution. 
We proceed in the spirit of Selznick's  institutional analysis, but our 
approach differs from his in two ways. First, we focus exclusively on the 
causes of legalization rather than its effects. The second difference con- 
cerns levels of analysis. Selznick suggested that changes in the legal envi- 
ronment have opened the door to due-process governance, but he focused 
on pressures for legalization arising from within organizations. Following 
Edelman (1990), we argue that such pressures arise primarily from the 
institutional environment.  We  will  develop  a  model  that accounts for 
legalization in terms of a wider transformation in the relationships among 
the state, organizations, and individual citizens. In the late  1960s and 
early 1970~~  national and state governments in the United States became 
more aggressive in ensuring employee rights through equal employment 
opportunity legislation, affirmative action regulations, and related court 
decisions (see Edelman [I9901 for a thorough summary). Equal employ- 
ment opportunity/affirmative  action (EEOIAA)  law did not mandate new 
governance procedures, but it raised tremendous uncertainty about the American Journal of  Sociology 
legality of  traditional  employment practices.  Faced with an apparently 
hostile  legal  environment, employers  adopted  due-process  governance 
to cool out potentially  litigious employees  and demonstrate good-faith 
compliance with government mandates (Staudohar 1981; Soutar 1981). 
Since 1980, federal pressure for equality in the workplace has lessened. 
We show that this conservative shift has slowed the pace of  legalization 
but not reversed the general trend. 
We focus our analysis on the adoption of  three specific due-process 
policies: disciplinary  hearings,  grievance  procedures  for nonunion,  ex-
empt (salaried) employees, and grievance procedures for nonunion, non- 
exempt (hourly) employees. We define these policies in more detail when 
we describe our data. For now it is enough to note that all three policies 
imply  some  formal  dispute-settlement mechanism  outside  the  routine 
chain of command, but that they all represent different levels of commit- 
ment to employee rights. Disciplinary hearings allow employees to defend 
themselves against punitive  actions initiated by  management.  In con-
trast, grievance procedures are initiated by employees; when employers 
institute grievance procedures, they expose themselves to a potentially 
unlimited range of  complaints. 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON LEGALIZATION 
To provide a foundation for our analysis of legalization, we review three 
lines of theorizing about different aspects of  organizations and their envi- 
ronments.  The first concerns organizations'  internal structures, the sec- 
ond, their task environments, and the third, their institutional environ- 
ments. 
Arguments about the influence of  internal structure appear both  in 
Selznick's institutional study of legalization (1969) and in rational closed- 
system theories of  organizational structure. While the two sets of  argu- 
ments  are  motivated  differently,  they  generate  hypotheses  that  are 
remarkably similar.  Selznick  maintained  that larger and older organi- 
zations, and those more committed to equitable, rule-bound administra- 
tion, are more likely to support lawlike norms. Consequently, we expect 
that size,  age,  and bureaucratization  encourage  the  adoption of  due- 
process governance mechanisms. 
From a  rationalist perspective, legalization is a  special  case and an 
extension of  bureaucratization. Like Selznick, rationalists emphasize size 
and prior bureaucratization as incentives to further procedural formaliza- 
tion. Several early cross-sectional studies found larger organizations were 
more  likely  to elaborate procedural  rules  (Blau and Schoenherr  197 1; 
Pugh, Hickson, and Hinings 1969). The argument here is that formaliza- 
tion permits large organizations to achieve economies of  scale and reduce Legalization 
uncertainty.  However,  Edwards (1979) has contested  efficiency argu- 
ments, arguing instead that personnel policies are motivated by the need 
for control. His research identified a cluster of  personnel practices used 
in  core firms that constitute a  system of  employment  management  he 
called "bureaucratic control." Under bureaucratic control, internal labor 
markets provide a formal mechanism for handling hiring and promotion 
decisions; their main effect is to motivate employees and minimize volun- 
tary separations by promising workers regular career advancement. To 
Edwards, disciplinary  hearings and grievance procedures  further rein- 
force the organization's commitment to bureaucratic personnel decisions 
and long-term employment, thus we would expect them to appear where 
internal labor markets are well developed. 
Open-systems rationalists treat workplace governance policies as adap- 
tations to labor-market conditions. Economists maintain that labor turn- 
over costs create a  strong incentive  for firms to implement elaborated 
governance mechanisms to stabilize  employment  (see Schlichter [I9191 
1961). Williamson (1985,  1986) uses similar arguments in discussing the 
transaction  costs associated  with labor  recruitment.  In this view,  the 
problem of  labor turnover is exacerbated in industries where skills are 
not transportable  between  firms.  Where skills are firm-specific,  labor- 
replacement costs soar, owing to the need for specialized training (Doer- 
inger and Piore 197 1). Segmentation theorists argue that personnel prac- 
tices  reflect  differences  across  industries  in  the  social  status of  their 
respective labor pools: younger white males are more likely to be  em- 
ployed  in  core  firms that offer  high  wages,  promotion  opportunities, 
fringe benefits, and personnel practices designed to minimize turnover; 
women, older workers, and minorities are disproportionately employed 
in peripheral firms where such incentives are lacking (Hodson 1978; Ed- 
wards  1979; Tolbert,  Horan, and Beck  1980; Gordon, Edwards, and 
Reich 1982). Finally, both transaction-cost and labor-segmentation theo- 
rists offer  arguments about the mediating role  of  unions.  Williamson 
argues that nonunionized firms are likely to adopt purely internal griev- 
ance  mechanisms  as functional  equivalents for the  mediating role  of 
unions (1985, chap. lo), and Edwards argues that core firms adopt bu- 
reaucratic control policies with the conscious intent of forestalling union- 
ization (1979, p.  21).  Either way, we would expect legalization to be 
most rapid among nonunionized organizations. 
We use the term "neoinstitutional  theory" to distinguish our approach 
from those we have just reviewed. Where closed-system rationalists view 
legalization as arising primarily from within organizations, we argue that 
it is drawn from the environment.  Where  transaction-cost  and labor- 
segmentation models attend to the task environment, we are concerned 
more with the environment's institutional aspects. The argument of  neo- American Journal of  Sociology 
institutional theory is that formal organizational structure is, in varying 
degrees, a symbolic phenomenon, designed to demonstrate appropriate- 
ness and rationality rather than to achieve efficiency (Meyer and Scott 
1983; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In particular, the introduction of  due- 
process governance mechanisms dramatizes a commitment to equity and 
justice, independently of  how those mechanisms actually function. 
In more formal theoretical terms, we see two distinct, but interactive, 
processes driving legalization in the workplace. First, we draw on Di- 
Maggio and Powell's  (1983) argument that the state exerts "coercive" 
pressure  on organizations to adapt their  structures to institutionalized 
norms. There is now abundant evidence that the American state has had 
a  powerful  influence  on employment-relations  policy  (Baron, Dobbin, 
and Jennings  1986; Baron, Jennings,  and Dobbin  1988; Dobbin  1992). 
Our analysis will  focus on federal equal employment  opportunity and 
affirmative action (EEOIAA) policy, as well as on key court decisions at 
the  state level,  as salient parts of  the institutional environment.  But 
legalization  has not been  a direct result of  government mandates, and 
we are careful not to overestimate the state's  coercive influence in this 
area. The federal government declared its intent to eliminate employment 
discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and in Executive 
Order (EO) 11246 (issued in 1965), which required government contrac- 
tors to take "affirmative action" to assure the employment of  minorities. 
But as Edelman (1992, pp. 1536-41)  has argued in detail, the coercive 
power of  these policies has been weakened by their ambiguity concerning 
standards of  compliance, their emphasis on procedural  remedies rather 
than substantive outcomes, and their lack of  effective enforcement mech- 
anisms.  The law has confronted employers with broad imperatives for 
fairness but has raised uncertainty about the legal consequences of  em- 
ployers' actions. The procedural interpretation of  EEOIAA mandates by 
courts and administrative agencies has given employers the initiative to 
develop their own compliance strategies and rewarded them for gestures 
of  compliance made in good faith. 
We argue that, in recent decades, due-process governance mechanisms 
have become  institutionalized as partial solutions to problems  of  legal 
uncertainty raised by governmental antidiscrimination initiatives. Some 
impetus  for  this  argument comes  from  Edelman's  (1990) finding that 
adoption of  grievance  procedures  among California employers acceler- 
ated after the passage of  the  1964 act. Here we  offer a more detailed 
specification of  variation in federal pressure over time.  Our reading of 
the policy literature and of  our own data suggests that it is unlikely that 
the Civil Rights Act by itself influenced rates of  legalization, thus 1964 
may not be the appropriate take-off point. Aside from its inherent ambi- 
guity, Title VII was impossible to implement on a broad scale because Legalization 
it required  individual  workers  to file  suit before  enforcement  actions 
could be undertaken (Lempert and Sanders 1986, pp. 378-79;  Edelman 
1992, pp.  1539-40).  Executive  Order 11246, issued the following year, 
had somewhat stronger enforcement mechanisms,  but enforcement was 
"virtually nonexistent" for some time (Edelman 1992, p.  1541). By 1972, 
however, actions by all three branches of  government had increased the 
potential for enforcing Title VII and EO 11246. In 1970, the Office of 
Federal Contract Compliance,  the agency charged  with  enforcing EO 
11246, issued  Order 4, which required federal contractors to file work- 
force statistics and affirmative-action plans. In 1971, the Supreme Court 
ruled in Griggs v. Duke Power Company that no intent to discriminate 
had to be shown in suits against employers until Title VII; this position 
was reiterated in Albemarle  Paper Co. v. Moody, decided in  1975. In 
1972, Congress amended Title VII to give the Equal Employment Oppor- 
tunity Commission (EEOC) authority to initiate suits against employers 
in  federal  court.  Significantly,  many policies  in  this period  markedly 
broadened the government's commitment to eliminate sex discrimination 
(Edwards 1973; Hellam 1973). Revised Order 4, issued in 1971, required 
government contractors to include women as well as racial minorities in 
their  affirmative  action plans.  The Educational  Amendments of  1972 
altered the Equal Pay Act of  1963 to outlaw wage discrimination based 
on sex and added Title IX, prohibiting gender discrimination in educa- 
tion, to the Civil Rights Act. These actions increased the breadth and 
strength of  the  federal EEOIAA mandate  but did not reduce  its dif- 
fuseness or ambiguity. The enforcement climate changed again in 1980, 
the year Ronald Reagan was elected president, ushering in a period of 
probusiness,  anti-civil  rights enforcement policy (Days 1984, pp. 313- 
19). Thus it seems likely that pressure for adoption declined from 1980 
at least through 1985, which marks the end of  our observations. 
Our second  line  of  argument concerns  the  specific mechanisms  by 
which due-process governance has been institutionalized as a legitimate 
response to the uncertainty of employment-relations law. Here we argue, 
again  following  DiMaggio  and Powell,  that "normative"  pressures for 
legalization are exerted through the boundary-spanning activities of  per- 
sonnel management professionals. The general role of  such professionals 
in diffusing models of  governance has been  noted for some time (e.g., 
Vollmer and McGillivray 1960; Selznick 1969, p. 91). More recently Edel- 
man, Abraham,  and Erlanger  (1992) have documented the prominent 
role played by personnel experts and labor attorneys in constructing mod- 
els of  compliance with legal mandates. The putative role of  such profes- 
sionals is to package and transmit objective information to the employer 
about the labor market, including  its legal  aspects.  But Edelman  and 
her colleagues show that these professionals actively interpret legal doc- American Journal of  Sociology 
trine-typically  overstating the legal threat to employers-and  dissemi-
nate recipes  for  compliance  as a  means for  enhancing their  prestige, 
autonomy, and authority within organizations. 
Our review of  the practitioner literature shows that personnel experts 
have prescribed due-process governance as part of their EEOIAA compli- 
ance strategies. These experts offer three arguments that are noteworthy. 
First, in articles, they consistently emphasize the complexity and ambigu- 
ity of  EEOIAA law. Some writers attribute this ambiguity to a perceived 
contradiction between nondiscrimination (as mandated in Title VII) and 
affirmative action (e.g., Marino 1980), and others attribute it to confusing 
compliance requirements across different enforcement agencies and levels 
of  government (e.g., Higgins  1976). Second, they argue in the literature 
that executives' uncertainty about compliance standards created a per- 
ceived need to upgrade the personnel function within their organizations 
(e.g., Froehlich and Hawver 1974; Giblin and Ornati 1974; Garris and 
Black  1974). We  cannot say whether  personnel  departments, in  fact, 
became more powerful; our point here is that personnel experts sought 
to use the threat of  EEOIAA sanctions to increase their own prestige. 
Third, and most important for our argument, in the professional litera- 
ture procedural fairness  is emphasized as an important element in  an 
effective  compliance  strategy.  For  Gery  (1977,  p.  203),  compliance- 
oriented personnel reforms must include "establishment  of  a grievance 
system . . . to assure that all employees have an opportunity to resolve 
complaints . . . without having to appeal to external organizations such 
as the EEOC." Youngblood  and Tidwell (1981,  p.  32) argue that, to 
protect themselves from claims of  unjust discharge  under Title VII or 
other legal mandates, "enlightened personnel management typically em- 
braces a formal grievance procedure as a means to ensure fair and consis- 
tent treatment of  all employees."  On the basis of  data from a  poll  of 
federal affirmative-action compliance officers, Marino (1980, p. 32) rec- 
ommends that employers "establish a formal EEO complaint procedure 
within the facility" in order to demonstrate good faith and sensitivity to 
the problem  of  discrimination.  The importance  or due-process  gover- 
nance may have increased as the problems of  sexual discrimination, and 
more  specifically sexual harassment, became more salient in the  1970s 
(Linenberger and Keaveny 1981). 
The neoinstitutional  model thus emphasizes the joint  effects of  state- 
induced uncertainty and expert prescriptions  for governance.  We offer 
three empirical arguments that will serve as tests. First, it seems likely 
that the pace  of  legalization  has been  influenced  by the apparent rise 
and decline of  government pressure for EEOIAA enforcement.  Second, 
following several earlier studies (Dobbin et al. 1988; Edelman 1990, 1992; 
Dobbin et al.  1993), we suspect that an organization's  proximity to the Legalization 
public sphere is an important determinant of  its perceived vulnerability 
to antidiscriminatory norms and hence its receptivity to legalistic models 
of  governance.  Third, we test whether these models of  governance are 
adopted  more  readily  by organizations that are directly linked to the 
personnel professions. 
Our analysis  builds  on, and seeks to extend, two earlier  studies of 
workplace legalization, both from a neoinstitutionalist perspective. Dob- 
bin et al. (1988) used a convenience sample of  52  California employers 
to analyze two outcomes: the number of  different grievance procedures 
in place in each organization and grievance-procedure complexity (mea- 
sured as the average number of  steps across all grievance mechanisms). 
In cross-sectional analyses, they found that the number of grievance pro- 
cedures increased with organizational size and employees unionization; 
complexity was associated only with size. It is interesting that this study 
found no difference between public and private employers on either out- 
come.  Edelman's  (1990) study used  the same data but reported  more 
sensitive dynamic analyses of  the adoption of  grievance procedures for 
nonunion  employees.  Edelman  found  that nonunion  grievance  proce- 
dures diffused  more  rapidly  among large  organizations,  organizations 
with formalized personnel offices, and organizations that were closer to 
the public sphere; time-period tests showed an acceleration in adoption 
rates after 1964. This study goes beyond these early efforts in two ways. 
First, our empirical base  is broader  and more  trustworthy:  instead of 
using a small convenience sample, we draw on a relatively large sample 
of  employers that is systematically stratified across several industrial sec- 
tors and regional legal environments. The second advance concerns the 
theoretical implications of  our analysis. These studies have successfully 
established the plausibility of  an institutional account of  legalization but 
have not tested it against competing arguments. This study offers a more 
detailed institutional model and contrasts it empirically with dominant 
rationalist explanations focusing on the effects of organizational structure 
and labor-market conditions. 
SAMPLE, DATA, AND ESTIMATION 
The primary data for this study are drawn from a survey of  2 79 establish- 
ments. The sample includes public and private employers in the states 
of  New Jersey,  California,  and Virginia.  We  stratified  our sample by 
states to make our data collection more efficient and, on the basis of  our 
reading of  statutes, court decisions, and literature on employment rela- 
tions  law  (e.g., Curtis,  Simmons,  and Armstrong  1981; Jensen  1988; 
Maltby 1990, p. 53; Hawkins 1988, p. 525), chose these states in order 
to assure variability in legal climates. California is the most progressive American Journal of  Sociology 
state in our sample because of  its unique combination of  legislative and 
judicial  activism. Like many other states, California has essentially ex- 
tended federal equal employment opportunity guarantees to employees 
not covered by federal legislation, and California courts have been the 
most aggressive in the nation  (with the possible  exception of  those in 
Michigan) in protecting employees  from wrongful  discharge.  New Jer- 
sey's employment  statutes are similar to California's,  but the judiciary 
there has not been aggressively pro-employee, and Virginia is a right-to- 
work state with low levels  of  both legislative  and judicial  support for 
equal employment opportunity and employee rights. Thus we expected 
that California employers would be most responsive to due-process pres- 
sures and those in Virginia the least responsive, with New Jersey employ- 
ers in the middle. 
Within states, we chose a stratified random sample of  establishments 
from  13 sectors of  the economy. Private firms were sampled randomly 
within  states, using  the Dun and Bradstreet Million Dollar Directory 
(1985), from the following industries: publishing, chemicals, machinery, 
electrical manufacturing, transportation, retail trade, and banking. Hos- 
pitals were sampled from the directory of the American Hospital Associa- 
tion (1983). Nonprofit firms were chosen from the Encyclopedia of Associ- 
ations (1985). Official and commercial telephone directories were used to 
sample public agencies at the federal, state, county, and municipal levels 
within  each  state.'  For most  of  the private  firms,  an estimate of  the 
current  number  of  employees  was  available from directories,  and we 
excluded establishments with fewer than 50 employees.  Size data were 
not available in advance for public agencies; we either queried the agen- 
cies by telephone or discarded responses  from establishments that were 
too small. 
Information was obtained through  a mail  questionnaire, which was 
typically  filled out by  a personnel  director. The questionnaire asked a 
number of  questions about organizational structure, demographics, em- 
ployment-relations policies, and links to other organizations over the pe- 
riod  1955-85.  On the basis of  face-to-face  interviews conducted in our 
pilot study, we are fairly confident of the information available from this 
source. We contacted a total of 620 organizations, and 386 questionnaires 
were  returned.  Of  these,  86 were  unusable  because  the organizations 
never met our minimum size criterion, which left a total of  300 valid 
responses.  Our response rate of  48% compares favorably with those in 
other  organizational  studies:  Blau  et al.  (1976) report  a  rate of  36%, 
* Aldrich et al. (1988) offer thoughtful insights on the limitations of  such sources as a 
basis for sampling organizations.They conclude in particular that these sources are 
likely to underrepresent newer forms of  organizations. Legalization 
Lincoln and Kalleberg (1985) report a rate of  35%, and Edelman's (1992) 
recent Gallup-conducted survey achieved 54% (for a detailed discussion 
of  the difficulties associated with sampling organizations, see Aldrich et 
al. [I9881 and Kalleberg et al. [1990]). 
It is important to mention a limitation in our sample that might affect 
the interpretation  of  our results.  Since we  sampled only organizations 
that were alive in 1985, we have no information about those that merged 
or were dissolved before that date. If the adoption of disciplinary hearings 
or grievance procedures is related to organizational mortality, this omis- 
sion creates selection  bias.  We think this is unlikely because these are 
relatively small and peripheral changes in organizational structure, and 
they imply no alteration of  core technologies, functions, or markets that 
would directly affect viability. We cannot prove this argument, however, 
without data on no longer existing organizations, which are practically 
unobtainable. 
Three of  the items on our questionnaire provide outcome variables for 
our analysis. We asked employers when, if  ever, they first (1) initiated 
disciplinary hearings for employees, (2) initiated formal grievance proce- 
dures for nonunion, exempt (salaried) employees, and (3) initiated formal 
grievance procedures for nonunion, nonexempt (hourly) employees.  We 
also asked when, if ever, they discontinued each of the above procedures; 
as it turns out, none of  the employers in our sample ever revoked these, 
once they were put into place.3 Our pilot interviews convinced us that 
all of  the terms used  in the questionnaire, while perhaps too technical 
for a lay respondent, would be immediately recognized by any executive 
who was routinely involved in personnel matters. Special problems were 
raised by our queries about grievance procedures. We focused on mecha- 
nisms that had some minimal level of  procedural formality, but because 
of  the wide range of  variation across firms, it was impractical to ask for 
detailed  information  over  time  on  the  structure of  grievance  mecha- 
nism~.~ Use of  the word "formal" in the questionnaire items insured, at 
This observation may raise questions about our reliance on organizational memory, 
since it suggests that respondents may have forgotten the existence of  any policies not 
in force at the time of  the survey. We, on the contrary, regard it as a valid finding, 
since respondents often reported the discontinuation of  policies and practices-such 
as time-and-motion  studies, time clocks,  dress codes,  suggestion boxes, and annual 
bonuses-that  are characteristic of  more traditional management regimes. 
Grievance procedures vary, e.g., in the number of  steps involved, whether the first 
step is  to  report  the  grievance  to  an immediate superior or to an off-line official, 
whether-and  at what point-the  employee is entitled to representation, whether his 
or her representative may be another employee or an outside attorney, and whether 
the last step involves outside arbitration. See, e.g., Dobbin et al. (1988), Ewing (1989), 
McCabe (1988). American Journal of  Sociology 
a minimum, that respondents would identify written policies.  We also 
sought to  assure  that respondents  did not report  so-called  open-door 
grievance policies as formal grievance procedures. Under these policies, 
employees are told simply to take their complaints to a supervisor. While 
employers often  speak of  these  as grievance procedures and, in some 
cases, they are written into employee handbooks, they involve no struc- 
tural changes and grant no rights to employees. To  encourage fine distinc- 
tions, we included a question on open-door policies in sequence with the 
questions on grievance procedures. 
We sought also to capture changes in covariates over the history of 
each organization. Thus we asked about the timing of  a wide range of 
possible structural changes, such as the creation or dissolution of person- 
nel offices. For continuous variables, such as the number of  employees, 
we asked for estimates from  1955, 1965, 1975, and 1985. After coding, 
these data were  transformed into annual observations, yielding a data 
set with an N of 6,701 organizationlyear spells. For qualitative indicators 
of  organizational structure, it was straightforward to recode responses 
into  time-varying  categorical  variables.  Annual  values  of  continuous 
variables  were  estimated  using linear  interpolations  between  reported 
decennial figures.'  We are convinced that this method yielded estimates 
that are as detailed as organizational memory would permit; our interpo- 
lation strategy is obviously imprecise, but unbiased.  We supplemented 
this organization-level  dataset with additional industry-level  data pub- 
lished by the Bureau of the Census (U.S. Department of Commerce 1986) 
and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S. Department of  Labor 1975-87). 
Wherever they were available in these sources, we gathered separate sets 
of  industry-level  data for each state. The data to be used here include 
annual indicators of  wages paid to employees (by industry) and labor- 
force characteristics (by industry and state). 
We use these data to analyze the adoption of  due-process governance 
mechanisms within an event-history framework (Tuma 1979). Thus we 
focus not on the existence of  disciplinary hearings and grievance proce- 
dures, but on their adoption within a given spell. The adoption of  each 
legalization  measure  is  an event, and the dependent variables  are the 
For our data on organizational size, we took special steps to capture variation that 
was not linear across decades. Respondents were asked whether there had been any 
large changes in the number of  employees; if  so, how many and in what years (respon- 
dents could indicate as many as four such shifts, none reported more than two). These 
shifts were worked into our interpolations by assuming linear change on either side 
of  a reported rise or drop. Legalization 
rates of  adoption, which may vary both across organizations  and over 
time. Adoption rates cannot be observed directly, but we can get a sense 
of  the temporal path of  the adoption process by examining hazard plots. 
Figures  1-3  show plots of  integrated hazard functions for the adoption 
of  disciplinary hearings and grievance procedures for nonunion, exempt 
and nonexempt employees. These figures show a fairly common pattern. 
According to our data, in 1955, 13% of  employers had created disciplin- 
ary hearings,  but only 4%  had created grievance procedures  for non- 
union, exempt employees, and 5% had created grievance procedures for 
nonunion, nonexempt employees.  By 1985, the figures were 5  1%, 49%, 
and 47%, respectively. Closer examination of  these figures suggests that 
adoption  rates  may  have  accelerated  in  the early  1970s and perhaps 
slowed a bit after 1980. For now, we treat the adoption process as time- 
invariant, and specify a conventional log-linear model: 
log r  = ax.  (1) 
In this equation, r is the rate of  adoption, x is a vector of  variables, and 
Q, is a vector of  coefficients. Later we will offer specific hypotheses about 
time-period effects and offer a simple extension of  this model. 
Year 
FIG. 1.-Integrated  hazard function: adoption of  disciplinary hearings, 1955- 




FIG.  2.-Integrated  hazard function:  adoption  of  grievance procedures  for 

nonunion exempt employees, 1955-85  (with 95% confidence intervals). 
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
Year 
FIG. 3.-Integrated  hazard function:  adoption  of  grievance procedures  for 
nonunion nonexempt employees, 1955-85  (with 95% confidence intervals). Legalization 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Hypotheses and Indicators 
We present hypotheses that correspond to the theoretical approaches dis- 
cussed earlier, focusing first on the internal bureaucratic structure of  the 
organizations,  second, on the task environment, conceptualized here in 
terms  of  labor  market structure, and third,  on  the institutional envi- 
ronment. 
Indicators of  internal structure include organizational  size,  age, and 
the development of  internal labor markets (ILMs). Size is measured  as 
the (log) number of  employees; we  expect positive  effects on adoption 
rates.  Age,  measured  in  (log) years  since  founding,  yields  contrary 
hypotheses;  while Selznick (1969) would predict that older (hence more 
bureaucratized and institutionalized) organizations would generate more 
formal procedures, Stinchcombe (1965) would expect structural innova- 
tions to appear mainly among new (hence less institutionalized and more 
flexible) organizations.  Existence of  ILMs serves as an indicator of  bu- 
reaucratic control mechanisms already in place. It is measured using an 
index, ranging in value from zero to eight, that shows whether, in any 
given year, the employer used written job descriptions, tests for employ- 
ment,  promotion  tests,  salary classifications,  performance  evaluations, 
job ladders, centralized hiring, or centralized promotion and discharge. 
We use three measures of  labor market structure to test the effects of 
the  task  environment.  First, we  use  a  binary variable  coded  "1"  for 
unionized  employers  and "0"  for  nonunionized  employers to  examine 
the role of  unions as labor market mediators. According to Williamson 
(1985) and Stinchcombe (1965), adoption of  grievance procedures for non- 
union employees is likely to be more rapid among organizations without 
union contracts; disciplinary hearings may potentially appear as a result 
of  unionization.  Second,  an industry-level  measure  of  average annual 
wages per employee provides a direct indicator of  the cost of  labor; indi- 
rectly,  it represents  the potential for high turnover and dependence on 
firm-specific skills.  Arguments from transaction-cost  and segmentation 
theories would predict higher rates of  legalization in industries with high 
average wages.  Third, we use the percentage of  female workers, mea- 
sured within industries by state, as an indicator of  peripheral labor mar- 
kets. As segmentation theorists might expect, our early tests showed that 
percentage female, percentage black, and percentage older than 65 years 
are all highly intercorrelated; percentage female was most strongly associ- 
ated with legalization, however, and is used here as a proxy for peripher- 
alization generally. The hypothesis is that industries with higher percent- 
ages  of  female  workers  are more  resistant  to  legalization.  Two final 
comments about measurement: first,  the wage  measure  has been  con-American Journal of  Sociology 
verted to constant dollars (in units of $1,000). Second, both industry-level 
variables, when coded as annual figures, showed secular increases across 
all industries during the 30 years covered  by  the study. We  have de- 
trended the data by calculating annual changes in each. 
Our model of  the institutional environment suggests that legalization 
is the emergent result of  two interactive processes: diffuse coercive pres- 
sure for fair governance emanating from the state and the promotion of 
normative models of  compliance  by  professional employment-relations 
specialists.  We  argue, first, that organizations'  proximity to the public 
sphere  influences  their  vulnerability to pressures  for legalization.  One 
hypothesis is that public agencies are more inclined to legalization  than 
private firms. This simple dichotomy may appear tautological, suggesting 
only that government obeyed its own mandate, but we think the story 
is more  complicated.  We  agree with  Edelman  (1992) that pressure for 
legalization  has emanated primarily from the federal government and, 
more specifically, from particular agencies at the federal level.  But the 
American state is remarkably fragmented and disarticulated (Skowronek 
1982; Hamilton and Sutton 1989). The EEOJAA law is no more transpar- 
ent to government agencies than it is to private firms; public and private 
employers alike have been forced to construct strategies of  compliance. 
Our model suggests that public agencies were in a privileged position to 
develop persuasive compliance strategies but that their compliance was 
by no means automatic6 
We supplement this argument with two hypotheses about the state's 
influence on organizations in the private sector. Private firms that con- 
tract with the federal government are dependent on the state financially 
and fall under federal affirmative action reporting requirements; thus we 
expect them to be more prone to legalization than other firms. Nonprofit 
associations are considerably closer to the public sphere than for-profit 
firms because of  their special legal status and public-purpose  charters. 
Because  they  occupy  a  sectoral  space  "between  states  and markets" 
(Wuthnow 1991; see also DiMaggio  1986), they are also probably more 
exposed to institutionalizing pressures emanating from the state and thus 
more likely to adopt due-process governance. 
If  this were not the case we would expect legalization to diffuse downward, from 
the federal government to state and local agencies. In parallel analyses we tested for 
such differences; results showed no systematic patterns-if  anything, local govern- 
ment agencies were most receptive  to legalization-and  models were not improved 
by this more complicated specification. As we would expect, legalization moved across 
levels of  government at about the same pace (tables are available from the first author). 
Note also that, in these data, nonprofit associations were coded as private firms, and 
hospitals were coded as public or private depending on ownership status as reported 
by the American Hospital Association (1983). Legalization 
We approach the state's role in another way by examining interstate 
differences in adoption rates. Early tests of  interstate effects showed, as 
we expected, that legalization was most rapid in California, where courts 
have been  most critical of  the traditional employment-at-will  doctrine, 
followed by New Jersey and Virginia.  But by far the greatest variation 
is between California and the other two states; here we focus on Califor- 
nia as a uniquely uncertain and often hostile legal environment for em- 
ployers and hypothesize that employers there had higher rates of  adop- 
tion. Location  in the public sector, federal contractor status, nonprofit 
status,  and location  in  California are all measured using  binary (0,l) 
variables. 
We  offer  two  hypotheses  concerning  the  influence  of  employment- 
relations professionals.  It is likely  that organizations that have formal 
personnel offices and those that retain outside labor attorneys have been 
more likely than others to incorporate legalistic models of  governance. 
The presence of personnel offices and linkages to labor attorneys are both 
indicated by binary (0,l)  variables. 
The last institutional hypotheses are concerned with temporal changes 
in federal  EEOIAA policy.  We  have argued that federal  pressure  in- 
creased  after  1972 and declined after  1980. To test this argument, we 
estimated time-period models specified in the following way: 
log re  = ax  + 0,.  (2) 
Here the subscript p  refers to one of  three periods (1955-72,  1973-79, 
or  1980-85).  We hypothesize that the rate of  adoption for disciplinary 
hearings and both types of grievance procedures was higher in the middle 
period than before  or after-to  state it more formally,  we  hypothesize 
that 0, < 0, > 0,. 
In what follows, we use identical modeling strategies to report results 
on the  three legalization  measures.  In each  case,  the first step in  the 
analysis is to test rationalist arguments concerning internal structure and 
labor market conditions. In the second step, we add the measured covari- 
ates from the institutionalist model. Both of  these models address popula- 
tion heterogeneity only, as specified in equation (1). The third step is to 
include time-dependence  terms  that track salient changes in  the legal 
environment; these models are specified in the form of equation (2). This 
three-step modeling procedure allows us both to assess the relative contri- 
bution of  institutionalist arguments and to observe shifts in specific coef- 
ficients as we  add terms to the equation. We use only those spells for 
which there are no missing data on any of  the variables of interest (about 
88%  of  the total sample). Means, standard deviations, and zero-order 
correlations for all independent variables are reported in appendix tables 
A1 and A2  for both the total and reduced samples. Those figures show American Journal of  Sociology 
TABLE 1 
MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD  OF THE EFFECTS OF SELECTED  ON THE ESTIMATES  VARIABLES 
ADOPTION OF  DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS 
MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3 
VARIABLE 
N employees (log)  ....................... 

Age in years (log) ........................ 

ILM index  ............................... 

Union contract  ........................... 

Annual change, average wages  ...... 

Annual change, percentage  female .. 

Public sector  ............................. 

Federal contractor  ...................... 

Nonprofit association  ................... 

California  ................................ 

Personnel office  ........................ 

Labor attorney on retainer  ............ 

Time-independent constant ........... 

Period effect,  1973-79  ................. 

Period effect,  1980-85  ................. 

X2  ....................................... 

Coefficient  SE  Coefficient  SE  Coefficient  SE 
.163*  .075  ,081  .075  ,100  ,077 
.004  ,096  -.044  ,091  -.032  ,091 
.131**  ,054  ,036  ,056  .006  .057 
.691**  ,277  .677**  .301  .625*  .307 
-.262  ,241  -.370*  ,240  ,344  ,293 
-,241  ,317  -,014  ,284  -,115  ,307 
1.52*** 	 .290  1.64***  ,279 
,377  ,272  ,313  ,274 
,546  ,331  .704*  ,336 
,328  ,226  .404*  ,228 
,335  ,269  ,312  ,269 
,228  ,277  ,164  ,281 
-4.90***  ,475 -5.1  I***  ,484 -5.70***  ,534 
1.23***  ,319 
,360  ,365 
23.64***  55.84***  70.27*** 
NOTE.-N  = 4,258 spells, 88 transitions; in model 3, the constant for 1955-72  is constrained to equal 
zero. 
* P < .05. 
** P < .01. 
*** P < ,001. 
that the pattern of  variation in the original sample is closely preserved 
after spells with missing data have been deleted. 
Results 
Table 1shows results from models predicting the adoption of disciplinary 
hearings. Coefficients in model 1lend initial support to three hypotheses 
offered by rationalist theory. As predicted, larger organizations adopted 
disciplinary  hearings  at a  significantly higher  rate,  as did those  with 
well-developed ILMs and those with union  contracts.'  Coefficients for 
age, wage growth, and the percentage female in the industrial labor force 
are not significant. Note that the direction of  the wage-growth effect is 
negative, suggesting that, on  average, legalization was more rapid  in 
' Most of our hypotheses are directional; for these we use one-tailed z-tests to assess 
significance.  The exceptions are hypotheses regarding age and unionization  (in the 
case of  disciplinary hearings), to which we apply two-tailed tests. Legalization 
cheaper labor markets-the  very opposite of what transaction-cost theory 
would predict. 
Model  2  shows that the inclusion of  institutional covariates improves 
the fit of  the model significantly (P < .001), despite the fact that only 
one coefficient-that  for public  agencies-is  significant. As  predicted, 
employers in the public sector were clearly and significantly more rapid 
adopters.  While  the coefficients  for the other institutionalist variables 
are in the expected direction, only that for nonprofit associations even 
approaches significance. There are also interesting changes in coefficients 
associated  with  the  rationalist  variables.  The wage  coefficient  grows 
about 40%, but remains insignificant and unexpectedly negative.  More 
interesting,  the coefficients for size and ILMs drop effectively to zero 
when we control for institutional effects. In trying to make sense of  this 
shift, we initially suspected that size and complexity of ILMs are related 
to the establishment of personnel offices in ways that might obscure their 
individual effects on legalization.  There are no methods for measuring 
such  indirect  effects  within  an event-history  framework (Yamaguchi 
1991); as an exploratory test we estimated an equation similar to that in 
model  2  but omitting the personnel variable.  In these results the ILM 
coefficient is unchanged, suggesting that the effects of ILMs and person- 
nel offices are independent; the size coefficient increases by about 40%, 
but does not approach its magnitude in model  1. We conclude that size 
is partially important because it increases the likelihood of  having a per- 
sonnel office.  The growth of  ILMs seems unrelated either to personnel 
offices or disciplinary hearings.' 
Time-period effects are included in model 3. We treat the period 1955- 
72  as the reference category; its coefficient is constrained to equal zero, 
and we  omit it from the  table.  The period  coefficient for  1973-79  is 
positive  and significant, indicating that baseline adoption rates (net of 
measured covariates) went up sharply between periods. The period coef- 
ficient for 1980-85  is essentially zero, indicating that, on average, adop- 
tion rates in that period dropped back to pre-1972 levels. This supports 
the argument that the more activist posture of  EEO/AA law after 1972 
On  a  related  point,  one  reviewer  has questioned  our use  of  an ILM scale as  a 
predictor on grounds that due-process governance is, in fact, an extension of  internal 
labor markets-thus,  perhaps, producing  a spurious association that might obscure 
important causal effects. Indeed we suspect that both ILMs and grievance procedures 
are responses to change in EEOIAA law, but we are also convinced that executives 
recognize them as clearly different  kinds of  compliance strategies (see, e.g., Marino 
1980). As a check on our assumptions we tested a full set of  models that omitted the 
ILM variable and compared them to the ones in tables 1-3.  Results were substantively 
identical, thus ruling out a suppressor effect. Tables showing supplementary tests of 
the personnel and ILM variables are available from the first author. American Journal of  Sociology 
encouraged legalization and that, in the more conservative political cli- 
mate after 1980, adoption rates declined. Controlling for time dependence 
in model 3 also changes some of  the observed effects of  substantive vari- 
ables. First, the union coefficient drops a bit in magnitude, but remains 
significant. Second, the positive coefficients for nonprofit associations and 
location in California grow sharply larger (29% and 23%,  respectively) 
and become significant. Third, the negative sign on the wage coefficient 
disappears. This is not a substantively important point since the coeffi- 
cient in model 3 is still insignificant, but it enhances our confidence in 
the realism of  these models. The initial result was surely an artifact of 
time dependence: across all industries in our data, inflation caused real 
wages to fall through most of the 1970s, precisely the time when disciplin- 
ary hearings diffused most rapidly; in models lacking time-period terms, 
the coincidence of  rapid diffusion and inflation appeared as a negative 
effect of  wages. 
Models predicting the adoption of  grievance procedures for nonunion, 
exempt employees appear in table 2. Four of  the six coefficients for ratio- 
nalist variables, shown in model 1, are significant. Larger organizations 
and those with more complex ILMs appear as more rapid adopters. Con- 
trary to the findings for disciplinary hearings, unionized employers were 
significantly less receptive to grievance procedures of this sort. Again we 
observe an apparent negative effect of  wage growth. The variables for 
age  and percentage  female  show no  effects.  Tests of  the institutional 
environment, displayed in model 2, show powerful effects of  state action; 
location in the public sector, nonprofit status, and location in California 
all show anticipated positive (and significant) effects; but the effect of 
federal contracting appears to be zero. Influence of  the personnel profes- 
sions  is  strongly  supported by  coefficients  showing  that organizations 
with personnel offices and those that retained labor attorneys were sig- 
nificantly more rapid adopters. In model  2  the ILM coefficient is cut by 
nearly half, and the effect of  size drops away entirely.  As before,  our 
supplementary tests show that part of  the shift in the size effect (about 
25 %) is due to inclusion of the personnel office variable. Likelihood-ratio 
tests show that institutional effects contribute significantly to the model. 
Addition of  period effects in model 3 changes the picture in interesting 
ways.  The ILM effect  drops out, and the wage  effect again becomes 
positive,  but insignificant.  Other effects  are  consistent  with  model  2; 
indeed the  coefficients  for  unionization, location  in  the public  sector, 
and nonprofit  associations grow markedly stronger. The period effects 
themselves are a bit different from those in table 1. Both period coeffi- 
cients are significant and positive, and, while the second coefficient shows 
that adoption rates decelerated about 20% after 1980, the difference does 
not appear to be statistically significant (using 95% confidence intervals, Legalization 
TABLE 2 
MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD  OF THE EFFECTS OF SELECTED  ON THE ESTIMATES  VARIABLES 
ADOPTION OF  GRIEVANCE  FOR  EXEMPT  EMPLOYEES  PROCEDURES  NONUNION, 
MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3 
VARIABLE  Coefficient  SE  Coefficient  SE  Coefficient  SE 
N employees (log)  .......................  .230*** ,074  ,100  ,075  ,129  ,079 

Age in years (log) ........................  -,112  ,090  -.12 1  ,094  - ,110  ,093 

ILM index  ................................  .230*** ,049  .122*  ,056  ,057  ,058 

Union contract  ........................... - 1.04**  ,362 - 1.26***  ,379 -1.48***  ,385 

Annual change, average wages  ......  -.576**  ,220  -.617**  ,227  ,215  ,277 

Annual change, percentage female  ..  ,097  ,306  -,027  ,301  -. 138  ,321 

Public sector  ..................... ........  .558*  ,296  1.00***  ,310 

Federal contractor  ......................  -.086  ,256  -.I53  ,258 

Nonprofit association  ...................  .850**  ,292  1.19***  ,303 

California  ..............................  .552**  ,213  .672*** ,216 

Personnel office  ..........................  .481*  ,255  .428*  ,254 

Labor attorney on retainer  ............  .843*** ,246  .847*** ,245 

Time-independent constant  ...........  -4.93***  ,446 -4.90***  .45 1 -5.86***  ,512 

Period effect,  1973-79  .................  1.56***  ,318 

Period effect,  1980-85  .................  1.25***  ,330 

............................................  56.24***  90.84***  117.89*** 

NOTE.-N  = 4,644 spells, 97 transitions; in model 3, the constant for 1955-72  is constrained to equal 
zero. 
* P < .05. 
** P < .01. 
*** P < ,001. 
the two estimates overlap). Thus the model gives additional support to 
the  hypothesis  that changes in  EEOiAA law accelerated the  pace  of 
legalization,  but support for the "Reagan effect" in this case is weaker. 
The last set of  models, showing effects on adoption rates of  grievance 
procedures for nonunion  hourly employees, is displayed in table 3. In 
model 1, size and ILM complexity appear to significantly encourage legal- 
ization; nonunionized organizations were significantly more rapid adopt- 
ers than those with union contracts. Again wage increases show a count- 
erhypothetical  negative  effect,  and neither  age  nor  percentage  female 
shows any effect at all. In model 2, several of  the institutional variables 
show significant effects. Nonprofit associations and California employers 
had significantly higher rates of  adoption, but coefficients for location in 
the public sector and federal contracting are insignificant. Formation of 
a personnel office and retaining a labor attorney both accelerated adop- 
tion rates to a significant degree. In this intermediate specification, the 
ILM and unionization coefficients retain their significance, but the effect American Journal of  Sociology 
TABLE 3 
MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD  OF  THE EFFECTS OF SELECTED  ON THE ESTIMATES  VARIABLES 
ADOPTION OF  GRIEVANCE  FOR  NONUNION,  EMPLOYEES PROCEDURES  NONEXEMPT 
VARIABLE  Coefficient  SE  Coefficient  SE  Coefficient  SE 
N employees (log)  ....................... 

Age in years (log) ........................ 

ILM index  ............................. 

Union contract  ........................... 

Annual change, average wages  ...... 
Annual change, percentage female  . . 
Public sector  ............................ 

Federal contractor  ...................... 

Nonprofit association  ................... 

California  ................................. 

Personnel office  .......................... 

Labor attorney on retainer  ............ 

Time-independent constant  ........... 

Period effect, 1973-79  ................. 





NOTE.-N  = 4,683 spells, 91 transitions; in model 3, the constant for 1955-72  is constrained to equal 
zero. 
* P < .05. 
** P < .01. 
*** P < ,001. 
of  size drops to zero; controlling for the effect of  personnel offices alone 
accounts for most of  this shift (about 68%). 
Period effects operate like those in table 2: both coefficients are signifi- 
cant, and a likelihood-ratio test shows that model 3 fits the data signifi- 
cantly better than model  2. Again,  adoption accelerated  most  rapidly 
from  1973 to  1979; adoption rates during this period were significantly 
higher than before, but the decelerative trend after 1980 is not statistically 
significant.  Coefficients  for  substantive  variables  are  only  slightly 
changed. As  in table  2, the ILM effect drops effectively to zero.  The 
public-sector  variable nearly triples in magnitude and becomes signifi- 
cant.  Other institutional variables-once  again with  the  exception of 
federal  contracting-retain  their  positive  effects  in  a  fully  specified 
model. 
In summary, the most emphatic result of  the analysis is that, for all 
outcomes, state pressure-indicated  by public and nonprofit status, loca- 
tion in California, and period-specific policy shifts-appears  strongly as- Legalization 
sociated with the pace of legalization. Results also show differences across 
the three outcomes, mainly having to do with the mechanisms through 
which  fuzzy  government  positions  were  translated  into formal gover- 
nance policies. Disciplinary hearings are associated with unionization but 
not with links to the human relations professions.  Our reading suggests 
that disciplinary hearings have long been a standard feature of collective- 
bargaining agreements; we suspect that recent organizing efforts are at 
least partially responsible for their continued diffu~ion.~  By contrast, both 
types of  grievance procedures are positively associated with links to the 
human relations professions and negatively associated with unions. We 
have three speculations  about why the conservative  shift in the  1980s 
shows strong effects on the adoption of  disciplinary hearings and weaker 
(perhaps null) effects on both types of  grievance procedures. First, since 
disciplinary  hearings  are  associated  with  unionization,  the  decline  in 
adoption rates after 1980 may be a by-product of the Reagan administra- 
tion's attempts to weaken organized  labor.  Second, our data are right 
censored:  the third period  spans a relatively short five years, and it is 
possible  that significant declines  in  adoption rates  for  both  grievance 
procedures would appear if our observations were extended. Third, how- 
ever, it is also possible that by 1980 the due-process model of governance 
was so well institutionalized in the nonunion workplace that it continued 
to spread at a rapid rate, independent of  declining federal pressure. 
DISCUSSION 
Much previous theory, from Selznick's to that of  the modern open- and 
closed-system rationalists, treats workplace legalization as arising mainly 
within oganizations in response to internal pressures or demands of  the 
task environment.  We  find  almost  no effects that support these  argu- 
ments.  In fully  specified  models,  workplace size shows no  significant 
effects. We find some evidence that size has an indirect effect on legaliza- 
tion  via its association with personnel offices, but it is not an efficient 
cause.  Unionization  shows mixed  and ambiguous effects-disciplinary 
hearings may be by-products of  successful organizing efforts, but non- 
union grievance procedures appear most frequently in nonunion organi- 
zations; whether as a partial substitute for union governance, a strategy 
for forestalling unions, or both is unclear. Organizational age, the exis- 
Unions have had some of  their  greatest successes recently in attempts to organize 
employees in the public sector, and we initially interpreted table 1 as suggesting that 
disciplinary hearings have grown mainly from public-sector  unionization. We tested 
this interpretation by estimating a model that contained an interaction term for union- 
ized public employees.  The interaction term showed no significant effect, suggesting 
that the effects of  sector and unionization are independent. American Journal of  Sociology 
tence of ILMs, and the shape of external labor markets are unimportant. 
If the invisible hand of  rationality is driving the process of  legalization, 
we find no evidence of  it. 
What we do find is that the adoption of  due-process governance has 
been influenced by governmental attention to fairness in the workplace 
and by the employment-relations professions. First, rates of  adoption of 
the mechanisms we study are highly time dependent-rates  went up with 
expanded legal and political pressure in the 1970s and show some signs 
of  having leveled off in the 1980s. Second, proximity to the state pushes 
adoption rates up: public agencies and nonprofit associations were more 
rapid  adopters of  all three due-process reforms.  Third, adoption rates 
are higher among California employers, who operate under a legislative 
and judicial regime that has been more assertive of  employees' member- 
ship rights. Fourth, organizations that are structurally linked to the wider 
national environment through the professions (personnel officers and la- 
bor attorneys) are more  likely to create both kinds of  grievance proce- 
dures examined here. 
Federal contracting, one of our more direct indicators of linkage to the 
state, appears entirely  unrelated  to legalization.  This underscores  our 
earlier point that due-process mechanisms are not a direct result of federal 
regulatory pressure, but rather a symbolic response to diffuse and ambig- 
uously perceived shifts in the legal environment. Here the observed role 
of  the human relations  professions  in the adoption of  grievance proce- 
dures becomes theoretically important: these findings extend, and tend 
to confirm, arguments by Edelman et al. (1992) that personnel profession- 
als and labor attorneys play a crucial role in constructing the legal envi- 
ronment  and prescribing  governance  policies  designed  to  mitigate  its 
threat. 
We  conclude  by  noting  some implications  of  our findings.  We  can, 
obviously, make no real inferences about the effect of  workplace legaliza- 
tion for substantive employee rights. Our findings suggest that legaliza- 
tion is not aimed inward, toward specific employee demands or organiza- 
tional requirements, but outward at the shifting concerns of  regulators 
and courts. Thus due-process rules are vulnerable to the logic of  loose 
coupling (Weick 1976), and it is problematic whether substantive justice 
on  the shop floor is systematically  affected by the adoption of  formal 
procedures  (Gwartney-Gibbs  and  Lach  1991,  1993). Nonetheless,  as 
Edelman observes (1992, p. 1541), research on the work force has shown 
significant improvements in the status of  minorities and women over the 
past few decades.  Whether  this is at all due to more equitable gover- 
nance,  or  whether  governance  policies  themselves  are by-products  of 
more fundamental changes in the normative expectations of  managers, 
employees, and more general publics, our study can provide no evidence. Legalization 
Nor do we want to overestimate the degree to which legality has be- 
come a dominant model of employee relations. Our evidence suggests that 
concepts of  employee rights, citizenship,  and due process have become 
powerful metaphors of  governance among organizations in some societal 
sectors.  It is tempting to suggest further that legalization  may combine 
with  other  incorporative  programs-for  lifetime  employment,  career-
development training, and the like-to  give rise to a new employment- 
relations regime,  one that is considerably different from the Weberian 
bureaucratic  model.  Such  a  strong  statement would  be  premature  at 
this point.  We are mindful that some organizations-and  by no means 
inconsequential  ones-are  moving  in  precisely  the  opposite  direction, 
toward part-time work, subcontracting, homework, and out-sourcing to 
foreign labor markets (Pfeffer and Baron  1988). Ironically, these moves 
might  also  be  responses to threats in  the legal environment, albeit re- 
sponses of  avoidance rather than engagement.  Future research should 
explore whether legalisticlinclusive  and discretionary/exclusive  policies 
form empirically distinct clusters across organizations, and, if  so, where 
each tends to be most entrenched. Much will depend, it seems, on the 
assertiveness of  the federal government in pursuing EEOIAA goals and, 




TOTAL SAMPLE  REDUCEDSAMPLE 
VARIABLE  N  Mean  SD  N  Mean  SD 
N employees (log)  ..........................  6,560  4.85  1.61  5,929  4.82  1.61 
Age in years (log) ........................... 6,701  3.38  1.18  5,929  3.31  1.15 
ILM index  ....... .......................  6,701  2.66  2.43  5,929  2.57  2.40 
Union contract  .....  6,s  15  ,196  ,397  5,929  ,205  ,404 ..................
 .... 
Annual change, average wages  ......... 6,701  .I60  .458  5,929  ,166  ,454 
Annual change, percentage female  .....  6,429  ,434  ,389  5,929  ,440  ,391 
Public sector  .................................  6,701  ,293  .455  5,929  ,225  ,418 
Federal contractor  6,701  ,280  ,449  5,929  ,312  ,463 ..................
 ... 
Nonprofit association  ...................... 6,701  ,102  .303  5,929  ,115  ,319 

California  .......................... .....  6,701  ,355  ,478  5,929  ,368  ,482 

Personnel office  ............................  6,599  ,466  ,499  5,929  ,449  ,498 

Labor attorney on retainer  ...............  6,450  ,256  ,436  5,929  .25 1  ,433 

.. TABLE A2 
Annual  Annual  Labor 
Change.  Change.  Attorney 
ILM  Union  Average  Percentage  Public  Federal  Nonprofit  Personnel  on 
Variable  Employees  Age  Index  Contract  Wages  Female  Sector  Contractor  Association  California  Office  Retainer 
.......................... N employees (log) 
Age in years (log) ........................... 
ILM index ................................... 
Union contract  .............................. 
Annual change. average wages  ......... 
Annual change. percentage female  ..... 
................................. Public sector 
Federal contractor .......................... 
Nonprofit association  ...................... 
California ................................... 
Personnel office  ............................. 
Labor attorney on retainer  ............... 

NOTE.-Diagonal  upper half of  table shows correlations using pairwise deletion  of  missing data (maximum N  = 6.701). and diagonal lower half shows correlations 
using listwise deletion (N = 5.929). Legalization 
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